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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID WESTLY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF POLICE OFFICERS,
Plaintiff-Appellants,

Case No. 14842

vs.
BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS
OF SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action whereunder the plaintiff-appellants
sought a declaratory judgment seeking the lower court to:
(a)

Rule that a 1976 5% wage increase was illegal,

when the City payed that raise and accepted waivers,
only under procedures outlined by the City Commission;
(b)

Rule that a City Commission action, which

barred union activities on City time, was illegal; and
(c)

Declare that the Statement of Purpose found

in Section 34-19-1 Utah Code Ann. created substantive
rights of collective bargaining in Utah public sector
employees.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, J.E. Banks granted the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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•
defendant-respondent's motion to dismiss, with preJudice,
·
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-respondent seeks to have the lower court':
dismissal affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-appellants' complaint alleges as the legal
basis for relief, that the preamble to Utah's little Norris
LaGuardia Act created substantive legal rights of collective
bargaining in Utah public sector employees.

Premised

00

that legal theory, plaintiff-appellants assert:
1.

Salt Lake City, as a Utah municipal corporation,

failed to bargain in good faith when it:
(a)

Exercised its legislative power, adopted

i~

budget, set salaries for its 1976 fiscal year, and
permitted protesting employees to waive their salary
increase only in a procedure outlined by the Commission.
Count I and III, R-2; R-6; and
(b)

Passed a directive that City union activities

would be done on other than the public's time.

Count i:

R-5.
2.

The police union and its president are entitled

to a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
R-7.

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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count rv,

POINT I
SECTION 34-19-1, ET SEQ., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953 DOES NOT ESTABLISH OR CREATE SUBSTAciT'IVE
RIGHTS UPON WHICH THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS MAY
BASE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

A.
A STATEMENT OF INTENT OR PREAMBLE TO LEGISLATION
DOES NOT CREATE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.

The legal foundation of plaintiff-appellants' complaint
is the allegation that the preamble to the so called "Little
Norris-LaGuardia Act" of this State created a substantive
obligation upon the State of Utah and its political subdivision to collectively bargain with public employees.
The relevant portions of this preamble provides as follows:
"Declaration of Policy -- In the interpretation and application of this chapter, the
public policy of this state is declared as
follows:

* * *
"(3)
it is necessary that the individual
employee have full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives
of his own choosing to negotiate the terms
and conditions of his employment and that he
shall be free from the interference, restraint
or coersion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collect~ve
bargaininq or their (sic) mutual aid or protection."
34-19-1 Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended (Emphasis
added).
Preamble provisions such as the foregoing, have uniformly
been held to be a legislative statement of intent and
used in the construction of later substantive provisions.
They do not create or enlarge the scope of a statute.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This point is succinctly stated by Su th~ on
Statutory Construction; this treatise states:
"The function of the preamble is to supply
reasons and explanations and not to confer power
or determine rights.
[Citations omitted)
Hence
it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the-scope or effect of a statute.
[Citations omitted)"
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, id. at §47.06,
p. 81 (Emphasis added) .
Even the State of Washington's decisions (upon which
the plaintiff-appellants' placed virtual sole reliance under
the case of Krys tad v. Lau) upheld this principle and distinguished the Krys tad case cited by appellants.

It correcti:

noted:
"Both in England and in this country it
was at one time a common practice to prefix to
each law a preface or preamble stating the
motives and inducement to the making of it;
but i t is not an essential part of the statute
and is now generally omitt~d.
It is not only
not essential and generally omitted, but it is
without force in a legislative sense, being
but a guide to the intentions of the framer.
As such guide it is often of importance. In
this sense it is said to be a key to open the
understanding of a statute.
The preamble is
properly referred to when doubts or ambiguities
arise upon the words of the enacting part. It
can never enlarge.
It is no part of the la~.
Sedgwick, Construction of Statutory & Constitu~
tional Law (2d ed.), pp. 42, 43; 1 Story Constitution (5th ed.), book 3, ch. 6; Edwards v. Pope,
3 Scam. (Ill.) 465; Bouvier's Law Dictionary."
International U. of Op. Eng., L. 286 v. Sand
Point c. Cl., 519 P.2d 985, 989, 990 (\'lash. 1974)
(Emphasis added) .
This 1974 Washington decision thereafter took great pains
to distinguish the 1972 Krystad v. Lau case

. ted
Cl

by appellar'.

Specifically, they rejected the argument now urged upon
this Court by plaintiff-appellants that the preamble W
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thut state's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" created subs tantive rights of collective bargaining in public sector
employees.

In doing so, that court made it clear that the

preamble created no substantive rights and stated of its
earlier decision:
"It was not our intent in that case to lay
down a new rule respecting the import of policy
statements contained in legislation." Id. at
p. 990.
A further discussion of this 1974 Washington decision,
which virtually overruled the Krystad case, will be discussed
in subpoint I B, infra.
However, it is respectfully submitted that the lower
court was entirely correct in its holding that plaintiffappellants' reliance on a preamble to create substantive
collective bargaining rights in public employee unions was
ill-founded.

As such, all of their allegations failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted; this Court
should also so rule.

B.
WITHOUT SPECIFIC LEGISLATION, PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYEES HAVE NO RIGHT TO COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN
WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYER.
Other states considering the question raised by plaintiffappellants have uniformly held that, without specific
legislation granting rights to collective bargaining, public
employees have no such right.

Specifically, the laws

virtually identical to Utah's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act"
have heen uniformly construed not to apply to public sector
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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employees.

A recent illustrative case reJocting th e theory

propounded by plain tiff-appellants and summarizing the laii
in this area is Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of
Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884

(Wyo. 1975). Tliis case correctly

summarized the law as follows:
"The section upon which reliance is made is
a policy statement and a part of what is sometimes
described as a 'little Norris LaGuardia Act.'
Although not directly in point, it is hiqhly
persuasive that numerous cases have held the
prohibition aaainst injunctive relief therein
granted not to be applicable when applied to
public employees. Anderson Federation of Teachers,
Local 519 v. School City of Anderson,
(citations omitted) not only cites this as being
the overwhelming weight of authority but contains
numerous·citations and reiterated this view on
rehearing (citations omitted).
"It has been held generally that statutes
governing labor relations between employers and
employees are construed only to.apply to private
industry (citations omitted) and had the legislative intent been that municipalities be forced
to engage in collective bargaining that the legislature woul<l have been explicit in its language,
(citations omitted)
(Authority cited) is deemed
completely sufficient authority to our view that
there is a dual basis for holding that the statute
upon which the appellants relied is inapplicable
by reiterating what is termed as an old and wellknown rule '.that statutes which in general terms
divest pre-existing rights express words to that
effect.' And further, after a general discussion
of the purposes of the 'Norris-LaGuardia Act,'
concludes:
'These considerations, on their face,
obviously do not apply to the Government as an
employer or to relations between the Government
and its employees.'" (Citations omitted).
.
Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming,
id. at p. 8 8 8 •
The Utah Statute relied on by plain tiff-appellants
.

.

b

in this action, like the Wyoming provision a ov

e discussed,

. . .
t.
act which
forms a policy preamble to the anti-inJunc ion
follows.

.

As summarized in the Wyoming case, sue

h noliC]'
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~

stat.crn0nts have been un: forfTlly held not to apply to the
;:>ubl ic sec tor.
That judicial construction is supported by the obvious
intent of the Legislature through its draftsmanship.

Even

a cursory readinq of Chapter 19 of Title 34 reveals that i t
deals with defining court powers and remedies available in
the event of a private sector labor dispute.

For example

see §34-19-2: "Injunctive Relief Prohibited in Certain Cases;"
§34-19-4:

Injunctive Relief

§34-19-5: "Injunctive Relief

Reasons for Prohibiting;"
When Available;" and

§34-19-3: "Limiting Civil Liability of Union Officers."

None

of the substantive sections of that Chapter remotely deals
with collective bargaining, let along collective bargaining
for public employees.
It is, further, of interest that even these antiinjunction sections are uniformly held inapplicable to public
sector employment.

See analysis of cases so holding in

Union Organization and

Activities of Public Employees, 31

ALR 2d 1142.

It is also significant to note that Chapter 20 of Title
34 deals expressly with the subject of collective bargaining.
However, when the Legislature discussed the subject it stated:
"'Employer'
. . shall not include
any state or political subdivision thereof.
" 34-20-2(2) Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Replacement Vol. 4 B) (Emphasis added).
Thus, it is clear that the Legislature had no intent to
bring st;:,te or city governments into a compulsory collective
b,-,J -r~iinj

11-1

,-,,I ation,;hir with public employee unions.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

Obviously the plaintiff-appellants did not cite

ChJpter

20 in their complaint because of the cleur expression of
legislative intent.

Rather, they attempted to create a

substantive right out of a preamble to a chapter which was
devoted to defining court powers and remedies for a labor
dispute in the private sector.

Plaintiff-appellants'

shoe string theory is clearly contrary to the legislative
intent and action.
The conclusion that the Legislature never intended and,
in fact, never did create collective bargaining rights
for public sector employees, in the section cited by the
plaintiff-appellants, is further buttressed by other statutes
narrowly drafted by the Legislature, after Chapter 19 of
Title 34 was adopted in 1969.
Act,

See, Firefighter Negotiation

§34-20a-l, Utah Code Ann., 1953 adopted in 1975, but

subsequently held unconstitutional in Salt Lake City, et al.,
v. International Association of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786
(Utah 1977); and Public Transit District Act, §11-20-31,
Utah Code Ann., 1953, adopted 1969, 1st Special Session.
These later acts are specific and narrowly addressed
to groups of public employees for collective bargaining.
One must ask why, if rights of collective bargaining for
public employees were intended to be granted under the
Utah "Little Norr is-LaGuardia Act," were these subsequent
acts necessary?

Also, one must ask why such legislative
.

intent and action as plaintiff-appellants now urge is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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so

cleverly obscrued in a preamble to a chapter intended to
define the court's role in pri?ate sector labor disputes?
The answer seems clear that there was no such intent or

action.
Interestingly, every state court, which has been urged
to adopt the reasoning pressed by plaintiff-appellants, has
likewise uniformly rejected the invitation.

The case most

illuminative of this point is the State of Washington's
decision which distinguished the Krystad case cited by
plaintiff-appellants.

It expressly held that the preamble

to the so-called "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" could not and
was not to be construed to grant employees the right of
compulsory collective bargaining.
This 1974 decision distinguished the Krystad case as
a case relating to "yellow-dog" contracts, which interfered
with the right of employees to form or join a labor organization.

The court held as follows:
"Reading RCW 49.32 [Preamble to Little NorrisLaGuardia Act] in its entirety, we are convinced
that its purpose was to facilitate the achievement by employees of an effective bargaining
position and that it was not its purpose to provide for compulsory collective bargaining.
"Where the legislature has seen fit to impose
upon employers as affirmative duty to bargain
with their employees, it has done so by express
statutory provislon." International Union of
Operating Engineers Local 286 v. Sand Point
Country Club, 519 P.2d 985, 988 (Nash. 1974).
(Emphasis added}.

-9-
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The Court thereafter correctly noted some of the problems
which would inherently occur from the judiciu.l legislation
plaintiff-appellants would now urge upon the Court.

It

observed:
"In urging the court not to read a new provision into the policy statement in RCW 49.32.020
[the preamble to the Washington Norris-LaGuardia
Act], the respondents have drawn to its attention
the inunense complexity of problems of labormanagement relations and the inadequacy of court
structure and facilities to administer the law
in this field without statutory guidelines or
regulatory agencies. Professor Cornelius J.
Peck also notes the hazards attendant upon
judicial legislation in this area (note 2, supra).
If the statute was open to the construction
contended for by the appellants, these considerations might well be significant in persuading the
court that such a meaning was not intended. We
need not weigh them, however, since we find
that neither expressly nor impliedly has the
legislature introduced into this statute a
provision imposing upon employers a duty to bargain
with 1-abor representatives." Id. at p. 988-989;
See also Note 3 at p. 988.
(Emphasis added).
If the state elects to require collective bargaining
between public sector employees and their governmental
employer, there are myriad problems which will require
considerable legislative study.
include:

Some of these problems

(a) How to resolve negotiation impasse, (b) What

issues may be the subject of bargaining and which are
management or governmental rights; that is, which subjects
are to be reserved as legislative in nature and, hence,
not bargainable,

(c) May strikes be permitted by public

employees and if so, by what groups and under what conditions,

(d) How will employee unit determinations be made,

how will that unit determination be authorized and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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certified,

,......
I

i

r

how many units may be certified, etc.
such complex issues which interface with the right of
the electorate to control their government and with government's duty to deliver uninterrupted essential and often
life supporting services, make the issues infinitely more
complex than private labor disputes.
These political-legal policy decisions must be hammered
out in the legislative process.

As other courts have uni-

formly held, these issues cannot and should not be resolved
by the judicial legislation urged by plaintiff-appellants.

It is respectfully submitted that this Court should reject
the plaintiff-appellants' prayer for judicial legislation
and affirm the Lower Court in dismissing its complaint.
POINT II
POWER TO SET THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF CITY EMPLOYEES
IS A LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION. ABSENT A SPECIFIC
LEGISLATIVE CHANGE, ESTABLISHING THE SALARY
AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF CITY EMPLOYEES IS A
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION VESTED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY IN THE BOARD OF SALT LAKE CITY COMJ.~IS
SIONERS.
Utah law is clear that cities have been specifically
granted the power to:
(R)egulate and prescribe the powers,
duties and compensation of all officers of the
city, except as otherwise provided by law."
10-6-29 Utah Code Ann. 1953 (emphasis added);
s~e also Salt Lake City, et al., v. International Association of Firefighters, 563 P.2d
7 8 6 (Utah 19 77 ) .
Further, police officers are defined in the Civil Service
Act dnd their acti~ities and rights monitored by the Civil
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Service Commission.
Code Ann., 1953.

See Section 10-10-9, et seq., Utah

No attack is made on the Civil Service

1

Commission and no appeal or relief has been suught concerning this matter by the Civil Service Commission.
Thus, the facts alleged in plaintiff-appellants'
complaint concerned acts, exclusively within the legislative and executive authority of the Board of Salt Lake
City Commissioners.

The complaint patently fails to state

a legal basis or claim upon which relief may be granted.
POINT III
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS'
COMPLAINT IS MOOT AND THEY SEEK MERELY AN
ADVISORY OPINION.
The thrust of plaintiffs' complaint is that:

(a) The

City gave to its City employees a 5 % wage salary raise, but
permitted employees to refuse to accept that increase upon
certain conditions precedent, among which was that the execu·
tion of the waiver form would have to be witnessed by a
member of the City Auditor's staff;

(b)

The Comrnissiondirect0

that no union solicitation or business should be conducted
on public time; and (c) The City Commission received certain
proposals from the plaintiff-appellants c01;icerning salaries
for the City's 1976 fiscal year and that the City did not
adopt, in full,

the union's recommendations; rather, it

exercised its legislative authority and set the salaries
for all City employees by passing an ordinance.

. . ffInterestingly, there is no allegation in plainti
app 'llants' complaint that any one of the City employees
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r

rntcrestinqlv, th2re is no alleqation in plaintiffappel lants' complaint that any one of the City employees
that received a salary increase did not willingly accept
or spend the money.

Further, there is no allegation that

any employee, who received a salary increase, attempted to
return it to the City or that a tender was refused.

Also,

there is no allegation (as in truth there could not be)
that the union was the certified exclusive bargaining agent
for the police.
Rather, the complaint anemically asserts that the City
action violated duties of collective bargaining imposed
by the preamble to Utah's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act."
Certainly, its prayer for injunctive and declaratory
relief (concerning a salary increase received and presumably
spent by City employees)
opinion.

is now just seeking an advisory

No relief is prayed seeking the City to receive

the return of that money and no allegation is made that the
City would refuse to accept such a donation.

The whole

issue concerning 1976 salaries has long passed into history
and is legally moot.
Likewise, the allegation of a legislatively mandated
duty to bargain collectively in good faith for the year 1976
is long since moot, quite aside from the fact that no such
right or duty exists in law, for reasons above discussed.
This Court can take judicial knowledge that the 1976 fiscal
Year of Scilt Lake City, under state law, terminated June 30,
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197 6, and that new salaries had been approvcc\ oml adopted
for the July 1, 1976 through June 30, 1977 City fiscal y
See,

f

ear.

"Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act," 10-10-23 et seq.,

Utah Code Ann., 1953.

Obviously, no issue remains

to~

resolved by the Court concerning those salary questions as
plead in plaintiff-appellants' complaint.
Thus, the only real issue presented by plaintiff-appelk
complaint, is their assertion that Salt Lake City and, by
implication, all of Utah's governmental employees have the
right in the future to bargain collectively in good faith,
with their public employers.

That legal assertion is unsounc

as a matter of law as heretofore discussed in some detail.
However, by virtue of mootness regarding past events, the
Lower Court's decision dismissing plaintiff-appellants' complaint should also be affirmed by this Court.
POINT IV
THE CASE LAW CITED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Plaintiff-appellants cite Education of Scottsdale v.
Scottsdale Education Association at page 8 of their br~f
for a point not divined by this writer.

Significantly, that

case has no language quoted and, insofar as the writer can
determine, i t has no relationship whatsoever with the
facts pending before the Court.

fird
The case concerns th e ·

amendment protected right of free speech and of asso

ciation;

ding could it
however, under no strained construction or rea
be read as imposing the duties on a public employer W
bargain collectively with its employees.
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roocl 1·; ·j;ers cited c1t page 7 of plaintiff-appellants' brief

01
-------

holclS exactly opposite to the position for which it is
citccl.

That case held that the First Amendment right of

free speech protected employees in their right to form an
informational picket, under some circumstances.

In addition,

the case specifically held that the public employees had no
right to bargain collectively with their government employer
(as that term is used in private enterprise) without a
specific state law authorizing and directing that procedure.
The case held that the School's Board of Regents could,
if they desired, meet with employees; however, they must
retain the final power of decision.

The court observed:

"The power to hire employees, fix their
salaries and wages, direct expenditure of money
and to perform all other acts necessary and proper
for the execution of the powers and duties
conferred upon the Regents carries with it the
power and authority to confer and consult with
representatives of the employees in order to make
its judgment as to wages and working conditions.
We hold the Regents have authority to engage
in collective bargaining in this context."
State Board of Regents v. United Packing House, etc.,
175 N.W.2d llO, ll2 (Iowa 1970).
". . . Such action does not. involve an improper
delegation of legislative powers to private persons
as there is no compulsion to sign an agreement
and the final decision remains in the Board of
Regents." State Board of Regents v. United Packing House, etc., Id. at p. 113 (Emphasis added).
The Court further summarized:
"On the other hand, if the legislature desires
t? give public employees the adv~ntages of collective bargaining in the full sense as it is used
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in private industry, it should do so by snecific
legislation to thilt effect.
\'/e cannotl!;~;-i--
authority under these general powers to a~r~e
to exclusive representation, depriving other
employees of the right to be represented by a
group of their choosing or of an individual to
represent himself.
(Ci tat ions omitted) . . .
The power to fix the terms and conditions of
public employment is a legislative function which
with proper guidelines from the leqislature, can '
be delegated to its administrative agencies.
"'An endeavor by the courts to define some
limited field for the contract system would be
an attempt at judicial legislation.'" State
Board of Regents v. United Packing House:-etc.,
Id. at pp. 113, 114 (Citations omitted and emphasis added) .
The Iowa Court then succinctly held as follows:
"We have heretofore held that the Board of
Regents has no authority to enter into collective
bargaining or collective bargaining agreements
in the industrial context. We have also held
the Board of Regents may voluntarily meet and
consult with representatives of groups of employees
to discuss wages, working conditions and grievances.
The decision whether to do so or not
remains that of the Board of Regents. Therefore, any picketing to coerce the Board of
Regents to bargain collectively against its
better judgment would either be illegal, against
public pcilicy or both." Id. at p. 117, 118,
citing a long list of cases which demonstrate
universal recognition of the same principle.
It is incredulous to the writer that these cases are
cited as authority for the proposition that public sector
employees are entitled to bargain collect.lvely, without
the specific grant of power by the Legislature.
do not so hold and, in fact,

The cases

the Iowa decision holds

directly to the contrary.
Similarly, the case of Krystad v. Lau

.
l

s not in point;

in fact, this case did not even involve the issue
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,

of colJecti

bargaining, aside from the entirely separate issue of
collective bargaining for public sector employees.

The

Krystad case involved a private sector employer who fired
an employee for seeking to form a labor organization.
This case was subsequently distinguished by the
Washington Supreme Court on the issue of collective bargaining.

As previously discussed in Point·I B, supra at p. 9

the Washington Court clearly held that the preamble to the
"Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" did not require collective
bargaining, and further, the court distinguished the case
in such a fashion as to virtually overrule it.

However,

with respect to the issue of whether the preamble to the
"Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" created a substantive right
of collectively bargaining, the court stated:
"Courts in other jurisdictions which have
been. asked to find in statutes of this kind
an affirmative duty to engage in collective
bargaining have consistently refused to do
so . . . (Numerous citations omitted).
The
appellants have cited no case in which a court
has found in such a statute the meaning for which
they contend.
"There being no affirmative duty on the part
of respondents to engage in collective bargaining,
the trial court properly dismissed the action."
Internationa~ U. of Op. Eng., L. 286 ·v. Sand
Point C. Cl., 519 P.2d 985, 990 (Wash. 1974)
(Emphasis added) .
In short, the plaintiff-appellants have cited absolutely
no authority for ~heir allegation that the preamble to
Utah's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" created substantive
rights in public employees, ''hich compel governmental
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entities to barqain collectively with public labor
izations.

0

rqan-

On the contrary, every case and every authori~

found by the writer holds exactly opposite to that position,
Therefore, the Lower Court should be affirmed in its decG
sion dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint.
CONCLUSION
The manner in which public authorities must determine
the wages, hours and working conditions of public employers
is governed entirely by Constitution, State law and Civil
Service rules and regulations.

These laws define and pro-

scribe the authority of a public employer and have specifically granted to the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners
the power to set salaries and other terms and conditions
of employment.
General policy statements, such as those found in a~~
injunction acts, were not intended and did not alter the
powers and responsibility of elected officials.

The complex

political-leg isl a ti ve problems of public sector collective
bargaining can only be appropriately resolved in the halls
of the legislative assembly, if a realignment of the tradi·
tional and legal relationships between the government and
its employees is desired.
Respectfully submitted,

:. ROGER F.

CUTLER

Attorney for Defendant-Respon
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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